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P  a  r  t  I 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
Chronological  summary 
Congress  of the  CSU  (Christian Social Union)  ~arty 
in Munich.  Speech by  Federal Chancellor Erhard  on 
the  Government's  European  and  foreign policy. 
Statement  by  Mr.  Werner,  Prime  Minister and 
Foreign Minister  of Luxembourg,  on  behalf  of his 
Government. 
General  de  Gaulle's  Press  conference. 
Point  of  view  of the  Federal  Government  con~1ng 
General  de  Gaulle's Conference. 
1.  Community  law  to take  precedence  over  internal law 
Following the nationalization of electricity production and 
distribution in Italy,  the  Court  of Justice  of the  Communities 
gave  a  ruling on  15  July in response  to a  request  for  an 
interpretation of the  EEC  Treaty.  Special  importance  attaches  to 
this ruling in that it defines  how  Community  law  stands  in 
relation to the  domestic  law  of the  member  countries.  The  Court 
stated first that under  the  terms  of Article 177,  the  domestic 
courts against whose  decisions  there is no possibility of  ap];::eal, 
are  bound  to refer the  matter to  the  Court  for  a  yreliminary 
ruling concerning the interpretation of the  Treaty where  any 
such question is raised before  them. 
The  Court  then stated that in contrast to normal  inter-
national treaties,  the  EEC  Treaty established its own  legal 
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dispensation,  which was  integrated with the legal systems  of the 
Member  States when  the Treaty  came  into force  and  became  binding 
on their courts.  Indeed,  by_establishing for an indefinite  p~od 
a  Community  with its own  institutions, its own  legal  competency 
and  status,  having  the right to international representation and, 
in particular,  endowed  with real powers  acquired  through a  re-
striction of  the  prerogative  of the  states or a  transfer of 
their powers  to the  Community,  the states have  limited - although 
in restricted fields  - their sovereign rights,  thus  creating a 
body  of  law  applicable  to their nationals and  to themselves.This 
integration,  within  the  law  of each member  country,  of  pro~ions 
emanating  from  a  Community  source and,  in a  wider  sense,  from 
the spirit and letter of the Treaty,  has  as its concomitant  the 
inability  of the  states,  in opposition to  a  legal dispen9ation 
they have  accepted  on  a  basis  of reciprocity,  successfully to 
introduce  any  subsequent unilateral measure  - the latter being 
unable  to take  precedence.  Community  law  cannot  indeed be 
~llowed to vary in its powers  of application  from  one  state to 
another in deference  to subsequent domestic  legislation without 
seriously threatening the  aims  of the Treaty and  causing dis-
criminations  banned  by  the Treaty. 
The  obligations  contracted under  the  Treaty would not  be 
unconditional but  only  contingent if they  could  be  subject  to 
re-examination as  a  result of  subsequent acts  of  law  of the 
signatories.  Where  the right  for  the  states to act unilaterally 
is acknowledged,  this is by virtue  of a  specific and  precise 
clause.  Furthermore,  requests  by  the  states for  exemptions  are 
subject to an authorization procedure  that would  have  no  purpose 
if the  states were  able  to contract out of their obligations  by 
means  of  a  simple  law. 
That  Community  law  takes  precedence  is confirmed  by Article 
189  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (the regulations shall be  binding and 
directly applicable in each Member  State).  Article 189  contains 
no  reservation and  would  have  no  effect if a  state were  able 
unilaterally to  make  it inop~rative by  an act of  law  demurrable 
to  the  Community  texts. 
It follows  from all these factors  that since _the  law  in-
itiated by  the Treaty emanates  from  an  independent  source  it 
cannot,  because  of its original specific nature,  be  legally 
3h2.llenged by  any  domestic ruling whatsoever without  thereby 
losing its Community  character and without  ·Jalling in question 
the  legal basis  of  the  Community  itself. Thus,  the  transfer of 
rights  and  obligations  in conformity with  the  provisions  of  the 
Tre~ty that the States  made  from  their domestic  legal  system to 
the benefit of the  Community  legal system involves  a  final re-
striction of their sovereign rights,  over  which no  subsequent 
- 2  -European integration 
unilateral act incompatible with the  idea  of the  Community  can 
take precedence. 
(Court  of Justice- Ruling  of 15.7.1964- Case  6/64) 
2.  Parliamentary democracy  and  international and  supranationa~ 
co-operation 
1.  The  curtailment of a  state's freedom  of action does 
but reflect a  curtailment of the  influence exerted by 
its parliament 
Governments  tend to play a  more  significant part than 
parliaments in all forms  of international co-operation.  The 
reason is that such  co-operation impinges  on  foreign policy,  in 
terms  closely linked with the policy of other states,  where it 
i~ not  - and it often is - a  counter measure  to action taken by 
other states; it is constantly being modified in line with 
changes  in the  international balance  of power. 
This  makes it difficult both to ascertain beforehand what 
course  should  be  followed  and  to assess after the  event the 
policy in fact  followed,  for  circumstances are not  conducive  to 
the  exercise  by  parliaments  of the right to obtain information 
and  pass  judgement. 
As  international co-operation increases and  becomes  organ-
ized  on  a  permanent basis,  that is within international organi-
zations,  the  curtailment of the  influence of  parliament becomes 
ever more  sharply felt.  The  governments,  on  the  other  h~nd, 
become  increasmgly free  to act independently of parliaments;this 
in turn may  well  coincide with - and  may  even result in - a 
restriction of the  freedom  of action of  the  governments at the 
international level. 
2.  .  The  curtailment of national sovereignty 
From  the strictly legal point of view this curtailment of 
national sovereignty,  as  a  result of a  state's membership  of 
international organizations  of the  conventional intergovernmental 
type,  is imperceptible.  In practical terms,  however,  this is not 
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the  case.  In view  of the  obligation to find  solutions by  co-
operation to a  growing number  of problems  that can  no  longer 
satisfactorily be  dealt with at the national level,  the states 
have not only to bear in mind  each others'  basic policies to 
reach agreement but to defer much  more  lthan in the past to 
pressures  ;of every  kind - and which  go  two  ways.  This  means  that 
at times it is no  longer in their power  to take  decisions as 
sovereign states. 
In bilateral relations between states,  recourse to pressure 
has  become  one  of the  everyday tools  of diplomacy, !varying in 
effect from  persuasion to  in~imidation; in multilateral relatkns, 
at conferences and  congresses and  especially in the  international 
organizations for  permanent  co-operation,  strong pressures are 
in evidence,  being exerted collectively and  often with subtlety. 
The ability to exert pressure  collectivelY is often deliber-
ately aggravated in terms  of its effects through procedural 
regulations  such as  the  control to ensure  that Member  States 
have  carried out their  commitments,  the  obligation to  submit 
reports  and  the debates held in public  on what  emerges  from an 
objective study by  experts of such reports  (ILO),  as also of the 
annual reports  of  the  OECD  and  NATO;  these allow for lively and 
frank discussions  on  the policies  of Member  States by  a  commi~e 
comprising representatives of partner states;  and  there are 
other similar ways  of exerting pressure collectively.  The  most 
obvious  type  of collective pressure is a  recommendation that has 
been adopted  by  a  given majority and that is not directly legal-
ly binding  on  the states. 
Collective pressure is an imperfect but not always  inade-
quate  substitute for the supranational authority that  th~ organi-
zation lacks,  while  ostensibly respecting the  sovereignty of the 
Member  States.  There is a  danger,  however,  that may  be arbitrary 
and that there  may  be  a  misuse  of  power~ 
•  A balance  of power  between  the  major  Member  States or 
between groups  of Member  States may  provide  a  guarantee against 
intergovernmental organizations becoming arbitrary.  But  coupled 
with this essentially delicate balance are  the  legal rules that 
specify both the  scope  of these  organizations and  their general 
policy.  The  fact that they include  extragovernmental and neutral 
pockets  of influence tends  to make  them more  objective and dis-
interested in the  line they  take.  ' 
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3.  The  position of national parliaments 
Co-operation between states has  grown  to the  point where 
an  increasing number  of questions  end up  by  falling permanently 
within the province  of  foreign policy and  thus  remain  beyond  the 
scope  of normal national parliamentary democracy.  The  resulting 
transfer of powers  in which the parliament loses  and  the  govern-
ment  gains  might•be  rationalized legally if constitutional law 
made  a  distinction between  international  treaties  and  the 
binding decisions  taken by  international organizations and  only 
providing for  parliamentary intervention in the first case.  With 
regard to  the  binding decisions,  parliament is faced with an 
accomplished  fact  even if it exercises  subsequent control  over 
government  policy.  Indeed,  undertakings  given  can  only  be  re-
scinded by  the  international organization and  even  international 
treaties that require  parliament's approval  or ratification 
before  they  can  come  into force  leave  the  parliament  only with 
the right of veto.  This  creates a  particularly delicate situation 
where  the  treaties  concern questions  that have  by  long  establiShed 
practice always  been  the  province  of national legislation. 
Such  a  development  may  also lead to a  se-r"'ious  loss  of 
prestige for  the national parliaments. 
!~.  Resoonsibility for  elaborating and  imolementing  the 
policy  of international organizations 
In an  international organization of  the  conventional  type, 
the  question of how  democratic  policies are  worked  out  and 
implemented is likewise  beyond  the  scope  of an internal problem 
of public  law  and  home  policy since it is usually impossible  to 
assess  or apportion the  elements  of national responsibility.What 
emerges  as  a  result of  collective pressure is that the  "general 
will"  of  the  organization never  stems  from  perfect unanimity and 
is indeed  sometimes  in conflict with what  one  or  more  members 
actually want  even if, as  is usually  the  case,  their approval 
appears  spontaneous.  In an international organization,  the  work 
of elaborating and  implementing policy is not  and  cannot  be 
directly subjected to  the  control of  an  inter-parliamentary 
body.  The  members  of  these  organizations are  in fact  the  states 
represented by their governments,  each  of which bears  the  re-
sponsibility for its policy at the national level but  cannot  be 
called to account at the national level without  endangering the 
unity  of  the political system. 
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The  value  of the parliamentary bodies  of  certain regional 
organizations set up  in Europe after the war  therefore lies 
mainly in the  fact  that they enable national parliaments quite 
independently  to  obtain an accurate view  of matters  of inter-
national policy.  No  doubt  these  inter-parliamentary bodies  exert 
a  collective pressure in these  organizations and this may  take 
tl1e  form  of opinions  and  recommendations  but - and this is 
understandable  - this pressure generally carries little weight. 
Thus,  the  conventional pattern of international co-operation 
does  not appear  to  be  very satisfactory from  a  democratic  point 
of view,  even  though  close  co-operation between  parliaments  and 
measures  taken by  inter-parliamentary bodies are  such as  to 
attenuate this problem. 
5.  Parliamentary and  democratic  factors  in the  ECSC 
As  a  result of the High Authority's  obligation to give  an 
account of its activities to  the European  Parliament,  relations 
have  been established between these  two  bodies  that appear  to 
show  a  wide  degree  of similarity with relations that exist 
between a  government  and  a  parliament.  The  High Authority  does 
not in fact  exercize its powers  independently  (hence  the dis-
cussions  caused by  the  "negotiated decisions")  and  the  Parlia-
ment  to a  large extent occupies  the position of a  national 
parliament in regard to the  foreign policy  of its government. 
Indeed,  the  High Authority discusses  decisions that it has  to 
take with the  governments  represented  on  the  Council  in exactly 
the  same  way  as  a  government  normally confers with its partners 
on  intergovernmental organizations.  The  influence  of  parliament 
on  the  common  policy does  not  go  beyond  the  extent to which the 
High Authority  succeeds  in pursuing an  independent policy.  The 
basis  of this influence is in any  case not very  sound,  for  the 
arrangements  for  designating members  of  the  High Authority  do 
not  in advance  guarantee  any unity  of views  between  the Execu-
tive and  the Parliament  and recourse  to  a  censure  motion is 
quite exceptional. 
There  does  not,  however,  appear  any  need  to  sound  the  alarm 
in regard to  the  parliamentary and  democratic  factors  in the 
ECSC  if one  bears in mind  the restrictions  imposed  by  the 
normative ·character  of  the Treaty  on  the  political freedom  of 
this Community.  If it is remembered  that the  powers  of the  High 
Authority are essentially administrative, it will be  clear that 
the  principles of democracy  are  in even less danger  in the  ECSC 
than in certain national administrative  sectors.  The  policy of 
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the  Community  is subject to a  reasonable  m1n1mum  control exer-
cized by  a  parliamentary body  and  those who  are subject to it 
are regularly  consulted and  they  also have  a  guarantee  of ade-
quate  legal protection. 
6.  Political responsibility in the  EEC 
However~  the  fact  that in the  European Economic  Community 
the  influence  of  Parliament~ whether  European  or  national~  is on 
the whole  and  almost without  exception as restricted as  is the 
case with the  ECSC  gives rise to  concern.  The  freedom  of action 
accorded  to  the  Council  and  the Executive  Commission within the 
framework  of the  Economic  Community  is so wide  in certain 
instances  that it is almost  impossible  now  to  speak of giving 
concrete  form  to  the  obligations laid down  by  the Treaty.  In 
regard to  agricultural~  commercial  and transport policy in par-
ticular the  institutions weigh up  the various  interests  involved 
as  they  think fit.  This  goes  much  further  than  the  kind  of ad-
ministrative activity devolving  from  the  ECSC  Treaty.  It invol~ 
activities that are essentially legislative and  governmental  that 
strongly affect  conditions in the  Member  States and their legis-
lations.  · 
The  division of  powers ·between  the  Council  and  the  Com-
mission  of the  EEC  makes  the  lack of democratic  structure even 
more  delicate. 
The  Council  decides  on  the  policy to be  pursued but  gener-
ally does  so  on  the basis  of a  proposal  by  the  EEC  Commission 
which is therefore in a  position to exert a  considerable  influ-
ence  especially since  the  Council  cannot pass  Commission pro-
posals except  by  a  unanimous  vote.This point is very  important 
because at the  end  of the  tran$ition period the  Council will be 
able  to  take  decisions  by  a  qualified majori·ty and  no  longer,  as 
previously~ by  a  unanimous  vote.  The  power  of decision accruing 
to the  EEC  Commission  concerns in most  cases  the  task incumbent 
on it to ensure  that the  provisions  of the Treaty are respected. 
Furthermore,  the  Council may  confer  on it powers  to execute  the 
rules that it establishes. 
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The  Council therefore has  the last word  in practice  on all 
those matters that have  a  political bearing. 
The  EEC  Commission is at all times responsible  to  the  Com-
munity for  the  decisions  taken by  the majority of the  Council  on 
the basis  of  a  proposal it has  submitted since  the  decision has 
in fact  been in line with its proposal.  With regard  to decisions 
unanimously  adopted  by  the  Council,  whether  these  be  on  the  bruns 
of a  Commission proposal  or not,  it goes without  saying that it 
is the national governments  that are responsible to/their parlia-
ments.  If such a  decision is in conformity with the  texts  sub-
mitted by  the  EEC  Commission,  the latter may  also be  called upon 
to give an account  thereof to the European  Parliament. 
This well  thought  out system is not,  however,  without its 
weaknesses;  indeed,  in a  certain number-of  cases  the  Council  may 
take  decisions by a  qual~d majority quite  independently of any 
formal  proposal  from  the  EEC  Commission.  The  most  !obvious 
instance of this is the  Community  budget,  that has  to  ·provide 
the  finance  for  the  new  European Agricultural  Fund,  which in 
turn will be  called upon  to pay  out  considerable  sums  to  finance 
the agricultural policy of the  Community.  In.practice parlia-
mentary  control  comes  up  against  the  secrecy  of Council  deliber-
ations.  Because  of this, it is usually impossible  to  check  to 
what  degree its proposals are  taken into account before  the 
Council  has  taken a  decision,  when  in fact it is just such  a 
check that would  be  of value  from  the  point of view  of Communi-
ty supervision.  Furthermore,  where  the  Council is able  to  take 
decisions  by  a  majority vote,  the  way  Council  members  have  voted 
is not  known  and this impairs  the ability of  the  national parlia-
ments  to exercise any  control. 
The  obligation to observe  secrecy as  laid down  in the 
Council's rules  of procedure  cannot,  however,  and  must  not  im-
pede  the  normal national and  Community  parliamentary control 
procedure  that stems  from  a  system established by  the  Treaty. 
From  a  parliamentary and  democratic point of view  one  overriding 
need is for  a  minimum  of public information that would  enable 
one  to establish where  the responsibility lay,  especially since 
quite  soon  the  Council will be  able  to  take decisions  of appreci-
able  importance  by  a  qualified majority. 
Since  the Council is not  obliged to account for its de-
cisions to the European Parliament,  the latter can only apply to 
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the  EEC  Commission which  can bring its proposal  into line with 
the  opinion of the  Parliament and  thus  give it greater weight.  It 
is therefore essential that the  final  EEC  Commission proposal  be 
made  known 1  for  there is no  doubt  that  the Executive  must  give 
an  account  of its decision to adopt  or  ignore  the  opinion  of  the 
Parliament. 
Even if it is not  possible to ascertain where  the responsi-
bility lies 1  the  participation of the  European  Parliament in 
working  out the  common  policy will continue  to lack proper  foun-
dations  and will be  ineffective 1  for  as  is the  case with the 
High Authority1  there is no real political solidarity between 
the  members  of the  EEC  Commission  and  the  majority in the 
European Parliament;for the  latter1  the  policy  pursued  by  the 
Executive  in the  Council  of Ministers  is an external  ~olicy. 
This  problem  can  only  be  satisfactorily solved by  strengt'1.en-
ing  the  federal  factor  in the  Communities 1  the.t  is by  broadening 
the  powers  both of  the  EEC  -:: o_-rlmission  and  the  European Parlia-
ment.  Appreciable  progress  could1  however 1  be  made  without  any 
formal  extension of  these  powers.  At  the national level  too 1  it 
has  been mainly  through  the  modification  of  the  machinery  for 
exercising constitutional powers  that  the  parliamentary  system 
has  evolved.  In general  the nature  and  extent of these  powers 
have  been respected at least in the  formal  sense. 
The  influence  of  the European  Parliament  on  Community  poliClf 
could  be  increased along  these lines 1  even without involving any 
one  of the  six governments 1  on  two  main points: 
Firstly 1  the  five  governments  could give  an undertaking to 
their parliaments  that they  would  only support candidates 
for  the  Executive  Commission  that had1  for  example~  the 
support  of a  two-thirds majority in the  European  Parliament-
by  agreement with the latter. 
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In this way  a  political link would  be  forged  between  the 
European  Parliament and at least seven members  of  the 
Executive  Commission  and  this would  increase  the  solidarity 
of the  two  institutions. 
Secondly,  the  five  governments  could give  to their parlia-
ments  an assurance  that they would  together decide  to adopt 
any  amendments  to the  Community  budget  that the  Parliament 
proposed,  for  example  by  a  two-thirds majority. 
The  Parliament would  thus have  its say in regard to the 
budget.for  the Agricultural  Fund  and  indirectly on what 
agricultural policy should  be  pursued. 
However,the  full development  of  the  parliamentary  system in 
the  Community will  depend  above all on  the  political courage 
shown  by  the  European Parliament and  the  EEC  Commission. 
The  EEC  Commission will not  show  the  Parliament  due  con-
sideration unless  the latter is ready in matters  of  moment  to 
resort to  a  censure  motion.  For its part,  the  Commission  should 
take  the  risk of putting the  question of  confidence  to  the 
Council if the latter seeks  to  take  decisions which  the  Commi~n 
as  guardian of the  Community's  general interests,  refused  to 
endorse. 
The  progress  of the  Community  seems  to have  become.irrevers-
ible.  However,  even  the risk of moves  by  the  Parliament and  the 
Executive  leading to a  political crisis that would  threaten the 
very  existenqe  of  the  Community,  appears  reasonable  in view  of 
what  is at stake,  that is:  the  development  of  the  EEC  towards  a 
healthier democracy.  This  need is becoming  the  more  imperative 
as  the  Community  develop~ and  as  the  powers  of the  elected 
national parliaments are reduced. 
("Internationale en supranationale variaties  op  een parlementair 
democratisch  thema"  -Opening address  by Mr.  P.J.  Kapteyn  on 
9  March 1964  on  the  occasion of his accession to the  Chair of 
the  Law  of International Organizations at the State University 
in Utrecht.  A.W.  Sijthoff - Leiden) 
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3.  The  European policy of the  Member  States 
A.  Germany 
At its session of  10  July~  the  Federal Cabinet  clearly 
confirmed  the  policy for  Europe  pursued  by  Germany  until then. 
\
The  Secretary of •State~  Mr.  von  Hase~ stated that: 
11The  Federal 
Government  is continuing without  any  change  its European policy, 
its alliance policy and its close  co-operation with France.  The 
question of a  choice  between  France  and  the  United States  of 
America  does  not  arise~  because  the  chief aim  of the  Government's 
policy~ which is to achieve  reunification~  does not  call for 
\
such  a  choice.  On  the other hand,  the  Government will endeavour 
to  put  the  Franco-German Treaty into full action as  a  basis for 
a  political union  of  the  Europe  of the  Six.
11 
Earlier~  on 30  June~  Mr.  Schr~der~  the  Federal Foreign 
Minister~ in reply to  a  minor  question put by  several members  of 
the  Bundestag~  confirmed again  that~  by  means  of a  European 
political union~  the  Federal  Government  was  trying to  complete 
the unification plan begun  by  the  European  Communities.  This 
should first extend  to  the Member  States  of  the  European  Com-
munities.  One  of the  most difficult problems  concerned  a  suita-
ble  form  of  co-operation with other  states~  and  this  could harilly 
be  solved by  a  debate  in the  Council  of Europe  - that is to say, 
with the participation of eleven states that were  not  members  of 
the  EEC.  The  Federal Foreign Minister  then referred to  the 
question of whether  the  Federal  Government  was  prepared to act 
upon  the  Committee  of Ministers  of the  Council  of Europe  in 
order that a  meeting  of  foreign ministers  might  be  arranged  -
after a  thorough  study  of  the  proposals  contained in Recommen-
dation 364  for  a  resumption of talks  on  a  political union  of 
Europe within the  framework  of the  17  member  governments  - to 
enable  them  to  exchange  views  and  put  forward  an  opinion to  the 
Consultative Assembly.  Mr.  Schr~der assured  the  m~mbers, never-
theless~  that the  Federal  Government  was  trying to bring about 
a  resumption  of the  discussions  concerning  the political union 
of Europe. 
At  the  convention of the  CSU  (Christian Social Union)  in 
Munich  (from 10  July  to 12  July)  the  party  chairman,  Mr.  Strauss, 
suggested that the  "next  step"  should  be  the  consolidation of 
the  six EEC  countries into a  political  union~  in order to  form  a 
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confederation.  States prepared to do  this should set up  a 
"Council  of European Heads  of State or Government"  which would 
meet  every  two  or three months  in order to discuss  precise  po-
litical questions  and  to co-ordinate their countries'  policies. 
Further,  they  should create  a  "General Secretariat"  as  a  techni-
cal administrative and  co-ordinating body,  as well  as  a  "Politi-
cal  Commission",  whose  members  should not be  supra-national 
officials,  but representatives  of their own  governments,  under 
specific instructions but with full  powers.  Their duty would  be 
to arrange sittings of the  "European Council"  and  to assess 
their results. 
"All European  countries willing to  form  a  confederation", 
stated Mr.  Strauss,  "should  be  invited to take this step." 
Mr.  Strauss is convinced that all paths  leading  towards 
European unity and  long-term stabilization of  NATO  must  include 
a  particularly close alliance between France  and  Germany.  "Their 
union",  he  stated,  "will mean  Europe's  renascence;  their holding 
back,  lost time;  their possible  separation,  a  further  decline  of 
Europe." 
Mr.  Strauss  introduced this statement with  the  following 
words:  "There  can hardly be  a  more  silly slogan than that of the 
Gaullists in the  CSU.  We  do  not have  to  choose  between Washillgton 
and  Paris",  he  continued,  "Germany's  foreign policy must  be 
geared both towards  European unity and  the Atlantic Community  if 
it wants  to reach its true goal." 
At  the  final meeting of the  CSU  party rally,  on  12  July, 
Federal Chancellor Erhard gave  a  detailed account  of the  princi-
ples of his European and  foreign policy.  He  advocated that  the 
creation of  a  larger Europe  - politically and  economically 
united - should start with the  Six.  If Europe  were  to  be  limited 
to  just a  few  states,  then the  smaller ones  would  live in fear 
of a  resurgent hegemony.  The  political problem here  was  to strike 
the right balance.  The  Franco-German Treaty,  continued  Dr.Erhar~ 
was  already achieving  the  co-operation between  the  two  countries 
that had  been  aimed at during the  1961/62 discussions  on  a  pro-
ject for  a  political European union,  including foreign,  defence 
and  cultural policies. Bilateral co-operation was  too narrow, 
however,  France  and  Germany  were  not  to be  suspected of only 
wanting  to remain  "among  themselves".  They  should  seek together 
ways  and  means  of associating the  other Member  States of the 
EEC  to the Treaty.  Dr.  Erhard declared that he  would  submit 
proposals  to this effect. 
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With regard to the  inclusion of defence  policy in the 
common  policy of the political union,  Dr.  Erhard regarded it 
necessary to clarify the  position of NATO.  He  suggested  thats 
after the British and American elections,  there  should be  a 
meeting  of the  heads  of  government  of the  main  NATO  countries, 
to consider  the  organization of  NATO  and  agree  on  any reforms 
that might  be  necessary.  Then,  in Dr.  Erhard's  opinion,  the 
European aspect  of the  problem would  probably  become  easier to 
solve. 
In addition,  Dr.  Erhard  once  again stressed the  Federal 
Republic's  close alliance with the  USA.  "Trust and alliance", 
he  stated,  "are  the basis of the  North Atlantic Defence  Com-
munity,  and  must  remain  so  - regardless  of any  changes  that  ~ght 
be  made  in its form".  Europe,  as history had  shown,  only had  a 
chance  if the  USA  could  find  an equal partner in the  union  of 
the  free  countries  of Europe.  "We  shall strive in the  future  to 
strengthen the  bonds  between  Europe  and  the  USA,  and,  above all, 
to keep  NATO  firm.  We  are,  moreover,  prepared in future  to  share 
in the  common  effort and  burdens  and  to  co-operate  closely with 
the  USA  and  the  other allied countries in achieving  the  MLF· 
(multilateral force)." 
On  31 August,  Federal Chancellor Erhard  spoke  on  the  German 
radio in an address  to  the  German  people  on  the  occasion of  the 
25th anniversary  of the  beginning  of World  War  II in which  he 
pointed  out that "no  government  alone  was  to  blame  for  the First 
World War",  but at the  same  time "it is perfectly clear that the 
main blame  for  the  Second World War  must  be  ascribed  to Hitler". 
On  the European policy of the  German  Government  he  con-
tinued as  follows: 
"Since 1949  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Parliament have 
pers8vered  towards  new  but political objectives.  In as  far  as 
the  German  people has  been  free  to determine its own  destiny,  it 
has  fallen completely into line with  the  free world with its 
political,  economic  and  technical power  as with its military 
potential.  We  are not sitting on  the  fence.  We  have  placed  the 
Bundeswehr under  NATO  command  and  fully integrated the  defence 
of  our land and Europe  with the  major  democracies  - that is by 
inseparable links.  This is at the  same  time  the  best proof that 
talk of  a  "spirit of revenge"  in Germany  is malevolent gossip. 
The  idea  of  a  "European  Community"  has  in every walk  of life and 
despite  every natural obstacle,  steadily won  both hearts and 
minds  and  cannot  now  be  extinguished. 
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The  Franco-German Treaty  of Friendship will be  felt as  a 
determined attempt  to eradicate an unfortunate past;  we  are 
going to  do  everything in our  power  to fulfil it with increasing 
vigour  as  a  decisive  contribution for  a  better future." 
Interview  on  Germany's  European policy given to  the  press 
by  Foreign Minister Schr5der 
Dr.  Schr5der~ Federal Minister for  Foreign  Affairs~ gave  an 
interview to  the  German  Press Agency  on  1  September  1964.  The 
text of the  passages  dealing with European policy was  as  follows: 
Question 
During  the  most  recent  Franco-German  consultations,  a  new 
approach to  promoting  the political unification of Europe  was 
agreea upon.  Appropriate  proposals were  worked  out  by  the  roreign 
Ministry.  When  will these  be  discussed with  other governments 
and  when  will they  be  made  public  ? 
Answer 
I  cannot  give  any  definite details as  to  time.  A certain 
interval will certainly be necessary to consider  the suitability 
of the  many  proposals  for  Europe  that have  already been made. 
Their  essential features will then have  to  be  embodied  in a 
formula  that must not  only reflect our wishes  but must  also ful-
fil two  further  conditions: 
it must first be  acceptable  to all the  EEC  partners; 
it must  secondly  leave  the  door  open  for  those  European 
states that wish to  join the  EEC. 
This  is not an  easy task; all the  more  so as  Europe,  after 
the  repeated  setbacks in its progress  towards  political unifi-
cation must not  be  disappointed again.  This  task calls for  enter-
prise but also for  caution and  a  respect for  principles. 
As  soon as a  plan is worked  out  it will have  to be dis-
cussed at Federal Government  level and its outlines will have 
to be  agreed with  the  Parliament.  We  shall then want  to ascer-
tain with our  European friends  whether  our  ideas tally or  could 
be  made  to tally with theirs. 
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Question 
But will not your  first step be  to reach agreement with the 
French  Government  ? 
Answer 
Permanent  and  thorough exchanges  of views  with our  French 
friends  are  provided for  in any  case under  the  Franco-Ge~man 
Co-operation Treaty.  In this matter  too  - I  must  emphasize  this 
- the possibilities will be  fully  exhausted.  It would be'lacking 
in political tact and  acumen,  I  think,  to interpret these  ex-
changes  of views  as being exclusive to the  point where  we  cast 
the  other EEC  partners  from  our  minds,  thus  doing harm to the 
general wishes  of Europe.  What  Europe  needs  after achieving 
economic  unification finally to achieve its political unificatbn 
is not  an ideological  or rhetorical approach,  but rather an 
effective plan that is thoroughly  thought  out and acceptable  to 
all. In short Europe  needs  a  political. result. 
Question 
Recently  there has  been talk of strained Franco-German 
relations.  Do  you  think this assertion is  justified and  can the 
Federal  Government  do  anything  in order to  improve  co-operation 
with France  ., 
Answer 
Franco-German friendship is,  I  think,  too valuable  for us 
to allow  ourselves to surrender to a  passing mood  of impatience 
or  res~gnation. We  should  indeed hold fast in all sobriety to 
lasting historical facts.  The  former  Federal Chancellor, 
Dr.  Adenauer,  and President de  Gaulle,  were  quite right to ex-
plain on  22  January 1963  that the reconciliation between the  two 
peoples  marked  a  historical event  that established their  rela-
tions with each other  on  a  completely new  footing.  The  two 
statesmen had already achieved Franco-German reconciliation at 
that time,  that is before  the Treaty was  signed,  although they 
knew  that the policies of their Goverr1I!ents  in many  - and  by  no 
means  insignificant - fields would  follow  a  different course. 
They were  genuinely  convinced,  as  we  are also today,  that mutual 
respect and  a  common  desire  for  a  permanent  and  friendly 
rapprochement  between  the  two  peoples  transcend any  differences 
of opinion however  serious  they may  be.  Such  community-mindedn~ 
- and this should not be  forgotten  - has  already led to appreci-
able  progress  in many  spheres.  On  the  other hand,  the  Community 
spirit cannot  remove  the still outstanding differences  of  opi.n:ion 
overnight.  The  particular differences·which President de  Gaulle 
enumerated at his  ~ress conference  on 23  July will be  discussed 
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as is usual  between friends  through  the  permanent consultation 
procedure  set up  by  the Treaty and  through diplomatic  exchanges 
of views  between the  two  Governments. 
To  conclude:  the differences  of  opinion that are still out-
standi~g between-the  two  Governments  after only a  year has 
elapsed since  the  Franco-German Treaty  came  into  force,undoubted-
ly call for  a  community-minded  search for  a  compromise.The  Treat~ 
which is·based on  these principles,  will certainly also be  able 
to  sust~in these  outstanding differences  of view,  whose  solution 
still stands as  an obstacle to the different interests of.the 
two  nations.  We  must  be  careful to avoid further  disagreements; 
in short,  mutual respect and  friendly attitudes are  only a 
beginning.  In this way  we  must  forge  ahead. 
On  24  July the  Federal Government  issued the  following 
statement in regard to General  de  Gaulle's press  conference: 
"At  the  press  conference which he  held yesterday,  the 
President of the  French Republic  expressed with great frankneps 
his views  on world  and  European problems  and  on  the  develop~ent 
of the  Franco-German Treaty up  to the  present. 
The  Federal Government  equally deplores  the  fact  that  co-
operation between the Federal Republic  of Germany  and  the French 
Republic,  as  provided  for  in the  Franco-German Treaty,  has  not 
yet led,  in matters  of first importance,  to an  agreement  of 
views  between  the  two  Governments.  German  policy is neither sub-
ordinated to  the United States of America,  nor  to France.  A 
common  policy between  two  governments  cannot  cover all the  views 
of  th~ two  partners.  For  example,  Germany  had  made  it.quite 
clear before  signing the Treaty that she  intended to take  part 
in the  proposed  NATO  atomic  fleet.  France,  which did not propose 
to do  so,  has repeatedly declared that she  fully appreciated 
Germany's  attitude. 
The  Federal Republic  sets a  high value  on  the results pro-
duced so far  by  Franco-German co-operation within the  framework 
of the Treaty.  The  two  countries  must  now  pursue their political 
efforts and use  every  endeavour to abhieve  the high aims  set 
forth in the  preamble  to the Treaty voted by  the Bundestag: 
- "The  maintenance  and  consolidation of the understanding 
between the free  peoples,  in particular close  co-ope~ation 
between Europe  and  the United States of America; 
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the  application of the right of self-determination to  the 
German  people  and  the restoration of  German  unity; 
joint defence  policy within the  framework  of the  North 
Atlantic Alliance  and  the  integration of the  armed  forces 
of the  States. belonging  to  this Alliance; 
the unification of Europe  along  the  path traced out by  the 
creation of the European  Communities,  including in the 
process  the United Kingdom  and  other States that are wiiUng 
to  join." 
The  German  Government will continue  to fulfil  the Treaty to 
this effect. It will do  everything in its power  to make  the 
Treaty what it should be:  a  means  of uniting  the  free  world 
through Franco-German friendship." 
(Die Welt,  11  and  25  July;  Bundestag Report  IV/2446,  20  June, 
Union  in Deutschland,  16  July;  Bulletin of the  Press  and  Infor-
mation Office  of  the  Federal Government,  16  July,  and  1  and  4 
September  1964) 
B.  France 
At  a  press  conference  given  on  23  July 1964,  General  de 
Gaulle  dealt,  inter alia, with European policy and  the  Franco-
German  Treaty. 
With regard to European policy,  the  President of  the  French 
Republic  stated: "It is undoubtedly desirable  that Europe  should 
maintain with  the United States an alliance which is to their 
common  interest in the  North Atlantic area so  long as  the  Soviet 
threat continues to exist.  However,  the reasons  that made  it 
necessary for  European policy to be  subordinated to  the alliance 
are gradually becoming  irrelevant.  Europe  must accept its share 
of responsibilities.  Moreover,  everything points to  the  fact 
that this would  be  to  the  interest of the United States,  what-
ever their power  and  good  intentions may  be.  The  number  and 
complex nature  of the  tasks with which  they are  faced  are  now  -
dangerously  perhaps  - beyond  their means  and  capacity.  This is 
why  the Americans  themselves  state that they would  like to  see 
the  old  continent united and  organized  - no  less of course  than 
countless  people  on  this side of the Atlantic who  call for  a 
united Europe. 
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But how  can this be  achieved  ?  That is the question.Indeed, 
established conditions,  agreed renunciations  and  stubborn mental 
reservations  cannot easily be  removed.  We  Frenchmen  feel that 
EUrope  should first be  11made 11  in order to become  European.  A 
11Europea:1  Europe"  implies  that it exists by its own  means  and 
for itself,  in other words  that it has  an independent world 
policy.  This is precisely what  is rejected,  knowingly  or unknow-
ingly,  by  those who  nevertheless  claim that Europe  must  be 
achieved.  The  fact that Europe,  having no  policy of its own, 
should  remain subjected to that dictated from  the  other side of 
the Atlantic  seems  to  them,  even now,  quite normal  and satis-
factory. 
Thus,  a  number  of people,  often sensible and  sincere,  have 
not  been advocating an  independent policy for Europe  - this 
being beyond  their conception  - but rather  a  form  of organiza-
tion that would  be  unfit for  such a  policy and  linked,  in this 
field as  in that of defence  and  economy,  to  an Atlantic  system, 
that is an American  system,  and  consec~uently subordinated to 
what  the  United States call their "leadership".  Such an  organi-
zation described as  federal,  would  be  based,  on  the  one  hand,on 
an  areopagus  of powers  not  ~ontrolled by  the  individual States 
and  called the  "executive",  and  on  the  other,  a  parliament with-
out national qualifications which would  be  called the 
11 legis~ 
lature".  Each  of these  two  bodies  would  provide what  would  be 
expected  of  them,  namely,  studies for  the  areopagus  and  debates 
for  the  parliament.  But  certainly none  of  them would  do  what.  'in 
short,  it would  not  be  intended that they  should  do,  namely  · 
formulating  a  policy.  While it is true that a  policy must  take 
into account  debates  and  studies, it is equally true that  these 
are  no  substitute for  a  policy. 
Policy implies action,  that is taking decisions,  achieving 
things  and  running  calculated risks backed  by  the  people.  Only 
governments  of nations are  capable  of taking  such decisions  and 
accepting responsibility for  them.  It is,  of·course,  possible to 
hope  and  imagine  that all the  peoples  of our  continent,  perhaps 
under  a  European  Government,  would  eventually be  one;  but it 
would  be  derisory to think that  this day  has  come. 
\ 
France  for  this reason did not wish to see  Europe  embarking 
on  an artificial enterprise that would strip the States of all 
authority,  misguide  their peoples and  impair  the  independence  of 
our  continent,  and  she  took  the  initiative of submitting propo-
sals to her five  partners  of the  Rome  Treaty for  organized  co-
operation,  which would  in due  course  foster  closer relations. 
As  we  know,  the  German  Government  had  tentatively agreed to the 
project.  We  know  that a  meeting of the  Six in Paris,  followed 
by  a  further  meetinp;  in Bonn,  seemed at f_irst  to be  leading to 
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a  positive result,  but we  also know  that Rome  refused to call 
the  decisive meeting.  Its objections,  as well as  those  of The 
Hague  and Brussels,  were  strong enough  to put a  stop  to every-
thing.  Finally,  we  know  that the  opposing  countries put  forward 
two  rather contradictory arguments:  (1)  That  the French plan did 
not  conform with their view  of a  Europe  having  for its executive 
a  commission  of experts  and  for its legislature a  parliament 
shorn of national realities;  (2)  That although Britain would 
never  consent  to sacrifice her  sovereignty  the  integrationists 
r~ould enter no  European political body  of which Britain was  not 
_l,.:., member." 
With regard to  the  Franco-German Treaty,  General  de  Gaulle 
stated:  "Considering that the  French plan for  organizing Europe 
had  been rejected by Italy and  the Benelux countries;  consider-
ing,  moreover,  that integration could  only  lead to an American 
protectorate and,  finally,  in view  of the  fact  that the United 
Kingdom  had  shown  during  the  endless negotiations in Brussels 
that it was  not in a  position to accept  common  economic  rules 
and  that,  by  virtue  of the  Nassau agreements,  its defence  force 
and,  in particular,  its nuclear  weapons  could not  be  European 
since  they  could not be  independent  from  the United States,  the 
Government  of the  Federal Republic  of  Germany  and  the  Government 
of  the  French Republic felt that there  might  be  some  value  in bi-
lateral co-operation.It was  then that,on a  proposal  by  the  German 
Government,the  Treaty of 22  January 1963  was  concluded.I had  the 
honour  to sign the Treaty in this hall with Chancellor Adenauer. 
However,  it must  be  admitted that while  the  Franco-German 
Treaty brought  about  minor results in a  number  of fields,  while 
it also  fostered  closer  contacts between  the  two  Governments  and 
their administrations,  which  on  the  whole  we  regard as useful 
and,  in any  case,  quite pleasant,  it has  not  produced  up  to now 
a  line of ·common  conduct between  the  two  governments. 
Obviously,  there is no,  and  there  cannot be,  real opposition 
between Bonn  and Paris.  However,  wheth0r  we  think  of the inter-
dependence  of France  and  Germany  with regard to their defence,or 
the reforms  to be  applied to the  organization of the Atlantic 
Alliance,  or  the attitude and action to be  taken towards  the 
East,  notably  Moscow's  satellites,  and  by  extension towards 
questions  of frontiers  and nationalities in central and eastern 
Europe,  or recognition of China and  the  diplomatic and  economic 
policies that could be  carried out by Europe  in regard to that 
great nation,  or peace  in Asia  and in particular in Indo-China 
and Indonesia,  or  development aid to countries in Africa,  Asia 
and Latin America,  or the setting up  of a  common  agricultural 
market,  with its bearing  on  the  future  of the  European Economic 
Community,  it cannot be  said that Germany  and  France have  as yet 
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agreed  on  a  common  policy.  Beyond all question this is due  to 
the  fact that Bonn  does  not yet believe that  such a  policy should 
be  European  and  independent.  If matters were  to remain perpet-
ually in this uncertainty there would in the  long run  be  a  few 
doubts  among  the  French  people~  a  few  troubles  among  the  Germans, 
and  a  reinforced  tendency  on  the  part of their Common  Market 
partners  to stay where  they  are~  perhaps  awaiting dispersal. 
However~  the  force  of things  does its work  in the world.  In 
proposing and  wishing that Europe  has its own  policy - European~ 
,independent and  organized  - France is convinced that she  serves 
world  equilibrium~  progress  and  peace.  Furthermore~  she  is now 
sufficiently strong and  sure  of herself to be  patient - unless~ 
of  course~grave events  abroad~led to  changes  in her orientation. 
As  a  matter  of  fact~ at the  recent meeting  of the  two  govern-
ments  in  Bonn~ Dr.  Erhard had  spoken  of an early German  initia-
tive.  While  waiting~r the  sky  to  open,  France will by  her  own 
means  pursue  what  could and  must  be  an,independent European 
polic~  - a  matter  of congratulation by  other peoples." 
(Text  of  the  press  conference) 
C.  Luxembourg 
Mr.  Werner,  President of the  newly-formed  Government,issued 
a  statement  on  22  July,  on behalf of his  Government,  in which he 
presented to  the  Chamber  of Deputies  the  guiding principles  of 
his policy. 
He  stated in particular:  "With regard to European unifica-
tion,  the  Government will support all efforts made  with a  view 
to speeding up  the  integration of national  economies within the 
framework  of  the  European  Communities,  taking  due  account  of the 
transitional stages  re~uired in maintaining  the balance  of 
sensitive sectors.  The  Government  is aware  of  the  significant 
progress  made  in respect of the  supranational principle and 
regards  this achievement  as  a  further  step  towards  the  gradual 
unification of our  continent. 
The  Government  refuses  to question the  basic principles of 
integration.  It is in favour  of  a  merger  of the Treaties.  How-
ever, it will not accept  a  reorganization of  European institu-
tions and in particular a  merger  of the Executives unless  these 
contribute  to the  development  of integration and  offer definite 
prospects  concerning the  organization and  future  aims  of the 
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Communities  as  a  whole.  In this respect the  Government  considers 
that any  institutional reorganization of the European Exeoutives 
can only be  carried out in the light of the particular  eondi~ns 
prevailing in the various fields  covered by  the  Paris  and  Rome 
Treaties 1  as well as  the specific administrative needs  resulting 
from  these Treaties.  It also feels  that  an institutional 
reorganization of the  Communities  cannot be  envisaged without 
consolidating the prerogatives  of  the European Parliament. 
In this connexion the  Gove~nment is in favour  of a  geogra-
phical extension of  the  Community  by  means  of accession to full 
membership  or associate  membership1  on  condition that internal 
integration is not  slowed  down  in the process. 
The  Government will also support all forms  of collaboration 
between existing organizations such as  the  Council  of Europe  and 
the Western European Union. 
With regard to the  seat of the European institutions1  the 
Government will assert the  indisputable rights resulting  from 
the  prominent/ part taken by  the  Grand  Duchy  in building up 
Europe.  It is not prepared to agree  to any  institutional reorgani-
zation of the  Communities  that does not provide  for  prior agree-
ment  on seeking a  fair solution to the  question  of the  location 
of the  European institutions." 
(Luxemburger  Wort~  23  July 1964) 
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Nigeria 
14 July: 
Chronological  summary 
Resumption  of association negotiations  between 
the  EEC  and  Niger~a in Brussels 
A Conference  on  the Association between  the  EEC 
and  the African States  and Madagascar 
The  International University of  Comparative  Science at 
Luxembourg  opened its summer  course  on  6  July  1964 with an 
address  by Professor  Giuseppe  Vedovato,  Vice~President of  the 
Committee  for Foreign Affairs  of  the  Italian Chamber  of  Depu-
ties,  on  the association between  the  European Economic  Communi-
ty and  the  African States and Madagascar. 
The  speaker began by  recalling a  declaration of  the 
President of  the  Republic  of  Gabon  and  of  the African and 
Malagasy  Union:  "Here  in Africa we  also have  a  foot  in Europe". 
This  expression  shows  the  nature  of  the links  that bind  the 
Community  to  the  associated African States•and Madagascar. 
These  are  indeed  bonds  of  close co-operation and not  of  sub-
jection of  one  party to  the  other. 
This  underlying principle is in evidence  throughout  the 
Convention that is the  basis  of  the  association between the 
Community  and  the  countries mentioned.  Professor Vedovato 
went  on  to  point  out  that the  regulations  governing  the 
association were  clearly the  result of  the  express  wish  of  the 
Six to act as  a  Community  in relation to  the African States and 
Madagascar,  relegating to  the  background  any  act that was 
specifically national  or reflected special interests.  The 
association furthermore  was  in no  way  an obstacle  to  efforts 
directed  towards  the unification of Africa.  There  were  indeed 
in Africa groupings  of  an  economic  type  to  which  various 
associated states  belonged;  this had never raised  a  problem 
of choice;  everything reflected the belief that close  economic 
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co-operation either of  the Associated States  amongst  themselves 
or between the_Associated  States~and third countries,  could not 
but  enhance  the  benefits  that  the association brought. 
The  trade  relations  that  the association encouraged  - the 
speaker continued  - brought  a  great number  of countries  into 
contact.  On  the  one  hand  there  was  the  Europe  of  the  Six in-
cluding Berlin;  on  the  other were  the  territories of  tbe  Associ-
ated States,  including France's  overseas  territories and  de-
partments  that had links with  the Associated States.  The  re-
lationships were  becoming  increasingly multilateral in charac-
ter,  in the  Community-Associated  States  sense  also.  Thanks  to 
the association,  furthermore,  action had  been possible at the 
international level by  common  assent  to try and find  a  solution 
for problems  concerning tropical products,  the  position of 
which  was  a  source  of concern to  those  responsible. 
Many  of  the  measures  provided for under the  Convention 
concerned  trade  and  equally,  technical· and financial co-
operation.  This  showed  that the  association was  not  designed 
for a  limited period but  to last.  The  speaker concluded  by 
saying that,  everything considered,  the  association established 
a  single~inded agreement  to  co-operate  that  opened  up  tre-
mendous  possibilities for the  second half  of  the  twentieth 
century.  "This highlights  the  fact  that it is  our vocation to 
be  a  united civilisation whose  new  mainsprings  will certainly 
produce  richer rewards.  The  association that  binds  European  to 
African and African to  European has  transformed  decolonization 
into  a  creative withdrawal.  By  an act that binds  the  responsi-
bility of all its members,  the association sets up  an inter-
national society that is at last close  to maturity.  This  ob-
jective has  always  been for all of us  a  source  of concern and 
of hope  and  a  reason for taking action.  With  this  in mind,  we 
can quote  the  words  of  a  poet:  We  have  come  to  the ultimate 
phase.  Here  on  each  side  there  is give  and  take." 
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7  July: 
III.  ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  INDIVIDUAL  SECTORS 
Chronological  summary 
Setting up  in Bale  of  the  Committee  of  Governors 
of  the  Central  Banks of the  Member  States,  in 
accordance  with  the  EEC  Council  decision of 
13 April  ).964. 
Issuing of  directives for  implementing  the free-
dom  of  establishment  and  the  freedom  to  supply 
services  in respect  of  independent  professional 
activities in industrial  and  mining  trades. 
1.  An  interview  on  the  Italian economy  by  Mr.  Schmucker, 
·German Minister for Economic  Affairs 
In an interview to  "Carriere  della Sera"  on  21  July  1964, 
Mr.  Schrr.ucker,  Minister for  Economic  Affairs  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  expressed his  opinion on  the  possible 
re~ercussions of  the  Italian economic  situation throughout 
the  European Community. 
Question:  What  makes  the  Federal  Government  uneasy  about 
Italy's  economic  situation?  Do  you  also fear the  danger  of 
imported  inflation? 
Answer:  Europe's  economy  is already  deeply  integrated.  Any 
threat  to  the  economic  balance  of  a  country  implies  a  threat 
to  other countries  as  well.  As  yet  we  cannot  speak  of  in-
flation in connexion with  any  of  the  EEC  countries,  but it 
is  obvious  that here  and  there  we  find  tensions  which,  if 
not  removed,  could seriously endanger  the  stability of  Euro-
pean  economy.  Germany's  concern therefore  is mainly  about  the 
general  situation in Europe. 
Question:  Does  Italy's  economic  situation constitute  a  threat 
for  the  whole  of  the  EEC? 
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Answer:  I  have  always  maintained and  I  would  repeat  that 
·Italy's present difficulties can be  overcome,  and  this is our 
earnest hope.  Only if these  difficulties cannot  be  overcome 
(which  seems  unlikely)  could  they  seriously threaten the 
Community.  This  does  not apply  to  Italy only but also  to  any 
other EEC  country in which  similar trends  exist or may  occur. 
Qllestion:  Do  you feel  that a  devaluation of  the lira is in-
evitable? 
Answer:  No,  definitely not.  However,  it is for Italy to  reply 
to  this  question. 
Question:  What  effective measures  could  the  European Community 
adopt  in order to  assist Italy? 
Answer:  The  EEC  has  already  taken practical steps  in co-
ordinating and,  consequently,  strengthening  - by  means  of 
recommendations  to  Member  States  - various  provisions  made 
by  the  Six for  ensuring stability.  The  essence  of  the  EEC's 
recommendations isthe  effiphasis  on  the  need  to  restore sta-
bility in the  trade  balance  sheet  and  to  apply  a  restrictive 
credit policy.  Up  till now  the  Community  has  not  adopted 
direct assistance measures  for the  individual  Member  States. 
With  regard  to  Italy,  these  could  only  be  discussed at Italy's 
specific  request.  I  hope,  however,  that  the  econoffiic  policy 
ffieasures  recommended  by  the  Council  of Ministers  of  the  EEC 
will  be  successful.  The  fact must  be  acknowledged  that it is 
no  longer possible for an  individual  country  to  conduct its 
own  economic  policy.  Interdependence  and  international co-
operation have  reached·such  an advanced  stage  that any  develop-
ment  in a  particular country has  immediate  repercussions 
throughout  neighbouring countries.  It is therefore  logical 
and  necessary for  each  individual  country  to  take  into  account 
not  only its  own  economic  situation but also  that  of  other 
countries  and  that this  should  be  followed  by  appropriate 
econoffiic  policy measures. 
Question:  Under what  conditions could  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  grant  a  loan to  Italy? 
Answer:  The  Deutsche  Bundesbank  {German  Central  Bank)  has 
already made  a  substantial contribution to  the  assistance· 
granted  to  Italy in regard  to foreign currency.  As  you  know, 
the  contribution was  made  without  any condition whatever. 
Whether  such  assistance  should  or could  be  continued  is  a 
question to  which  no-one  is at present in a  position to  reply. 
I  would,  however,  stress that my  country will  do  its utmost 
to  assist Italy.  I  have  been following with great  sympathy 
what  is being done  in Italy in this connexion and  I  hope  that 
these  efforts will  soon yield successful results. 
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Question:  :Do  you  think that  the  Common  Market  countries  could 
on their own  initiative reduce  the  pressure  of  their exports 
to  Italy and  increase  imports  from  our country until  such 
time  as  the  equilibrium of  our balance  of  payments  is  restored? 
Answer:  The  Feaeral  Republic  has  already increased its imports 
from  Italy.  These  have  gone  up  from  DM  1454 million.during the 
first five  months  of  1963  to  DM  1538 million for  the first five 
months  of  1964.  This  represents  an increase  of  5.8 per cent. 
Our  exports  to  Italy during that period increased from 
DM  2089  million for the first five  months  of  1963  to 
DM  2162  million for the first five  months  of  1964,  represent-
ing a  5.5  per cent  increase.  Imports  have  therefore  been 
greater than exports.  The  expansions  of  imports  from  Italy 
will certainly increase  as  a  result  of  the  50  per cent customs 
reduction among  Member  States  of  the  EEC.  This  reduction has 
already  been decided  by  Germany.  I  cannot  imagine  however 
that European countries  intend to  control the  trading machin-
ery,  nor is it correct to  speak  of  a  "pressure  of  exports". 
It is also necessary to  bear in mind  the fact  that the  move-
ment  of 'goods  has  a  stabilizing effect  on prices.  In my  · 
opinion this is a  positive fact.  With  regard  to  the  Italian 
balance  of  payments,  the  Federal  Republic  provides  a  large 
and constant contribution to  its equilibrium.  In the  past 
year alone,  German  tourists  spent  in Italy about  DM  900 
million.  The  balance  of  payments  between Italy and  Germany 
showed  in 1962  and  in 1963  a  credit balance  of  about  DM  750 
million in favour  of  Italy.  I  believe  that these figures 
clearly show  the contribution provided  so far by  Germany  to 
the  equilibrium of  Italy's balance  of  payments. 
(Carriere della Sera,  21  July  1964) 
2.  A study  on  the  "Europe  of  regions" 
Le  Monde  has  published  a  study  entitled  "From  a  Europe  of 
states  to  a  Europe  of  regions".  One  point made  is that 
developments  tending both  to unify  the  continent  and  to  give 
the  regions  greater prominence  are conflicting only  in their 
outward  appearance.  How  can a  continent  be  unified without 
being decentralized?  How  can one  think in terms  of  a  balanced 
development  without  a  regional  policy?  It is,  on  the  contrary, 
the  suggestion that it might  be  otherwise  that will  soon be 
regarded as  irrational for it seems  both  summary  and  superficliU 
and  does  not  really stand up  to  an analysis  of  the facts. 
Indeed,  while it is  becoming more  and  more  obvious  that 
regional  problems call for  regional  solutions,  both  on  a 
national and  on  a  European scale,  and  while  the  establishment 
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of  the  Common  Market  implies  a  vigorous  regional  policy,  the 
mistake  is to  suppose  that there  is a  conflict and  a  contra-
diction in terms  between the  emergence  of  Europe  and  a  resur-
gence  of  the  regions  that comprise it. It would  rather appear 
that regionalism and  European unification will  soon be  unable 
to progress unless  they  do  so  together.  It ca~ot be  too 
strongly emphasized that  economic .integration allows for 
regional  autonomy  - whe~her administrative  or political  - in 
that it makes  such  independence  indispensable if an effective 
regional  policy is to  be  pursued. 
The  economic  aspect is, furthermore,  not  the  only  one. 
The  diversity of  Europe  is more  than a  mere  fact -and, clearly, 
this  invalidates  any and  every  suggestion that Europe  should 
be  centralized.  This  diversity is something that must  be  kept 
alive and  safeguarded  - if only  out  of  respect for human 
values  - and  which  the unification of  Europe  may  indeed 
guarantee;  it is clear that building a  political Europe  is 
consonant with  a  twin objective  - giving Europe  greater unity, 
with all that this  implies  -common  economic  and  social  policies, 
an integrated defence  system.,  a  federal  authority,  an elected 
European assembly,  a  European currency,  a  common  working 
language,  a  capital that would  be  a  true centre and focal 
point  of  influence  and  political parties at the  European 
level  -and, at the  same  time,  keeping alive  the  diversity 
of  custom and  language  and  stimulating the  development  of  the 
various cultures  that are  the  essential wealth  of  the  European 
inheritance. 
Thus,  on this basis,  the  outlines already begin to  emerge 
of  a  political Europe  that would  be  the final  stage  of  a 
process  initiated by  the  gradual  establishment  of  the  Common 
Market. 
On  the  one  hand,  at the  upper level,  as it were,  the 
general  business  of Europe  - economic  and financial  policies, 
defence  and  diplomacy  -would be  entrusted to federal  bodies; 
on  the  other,  at the  lower level,  the  regions,  endowed  with 
their own  institutions and with fairly wide  powers  in the 
economic,  administrative,  social and cultural fields  would, 
in one  sense,  form  the  equivalent  in Europe  of  the  "states" 
in the  American Union. 
What  part would  then be  played  by  the  states  of  today? 
It will  be  much  smaller,  at  f~rst glance,  since  the centralized 
national  state would  lose  those  of its present  powers  that it 
had  to cede  to  tte European federal  power  - these  being the 
most  "political"  of its powers  - and also  those  that it ceded 
to  the  regions  -these being rather administrative  and culUnal; 
this is,  of course,  a  rather rapid and  sketchy analysis.  For, 
if it is agreed  that there are  to  be  -and that  there  are 
already  - regional  realities and  a  European reality,  there 
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remains  the  solidarity of  regions  sharing the  same  language 
and culture -in other words,  national  solidarity -and,  beyond 
the  linguistic frontiers,  the  solidarity born of  common  inter-
ests  that unite  a  group  of  regions  of  differing cultures. 
The  states are not  only institutions or "superstructures
1
', 
they have  also,  in the  process  of  time,  become  a  human  reality. 
In this sense,  even if,  one  day  -and we  have  not yet  reached 
that stage  - the  regions  do  in fact  become  direct members  of 
a  European federation,  the  states of  today will still continue 
in being,  in a  way,  in the  groupings  formed  by  regions  having 
the  same  language  and culture or whose  economic  interests 
are  common  or complementary. 
The  developments  leading Europe  towards  the  introduction 
of  a  federal  system appear  bo~nd to  be  spread  over a  long 
period.  Before  reaching what  one  might  regard as  the  logical 
conclusion of  this  process,  there  is every likelihood that, 
for  some  time at least,  one  will find  the  states constituting 
intermediate  bodies  between the  regions  of  Europe,  subsequent-
ly subsisting in the  form  of  groups 'of  regions  having cultural 
and  economic  responsibilities  - groups  of  regions  that are, 
for  example,  culturally  German,  French,  Italian or Dutch; 
these  groups  would  be  more  or less institutionalized -with 
primarily technical  bodies  comparable with  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority  - and,  depending  on  the  aims  pursued,  would  probably 
overlap  to  a  greater or lesser extent. 
At  all  events,  it is up  to  tLe  present states topave  the 
way  for the  Europe  of  tomorrow,  for it would  be  unfortunate 
if the  states,  wanting,  quite naturally,  to  continue  in being 
as  they are,  were  to  refuse  to  accept  developments  that would 
of  necessity  deprive  them in the  long  run of  some  of  their 
powers.  The  states, for as  long as  they continue  to fulfil 
their mandates,  will still be  the  trustees  of  t:te  peoples  they 
govern,  of  the  regions  they comprise.  And  their task,  at  the 
European level,  will  be  to  plan,·steadily and  in concert,  the 
futl.A.re  political structures  of. 'Europe.  In 1964 it has  almost 
become  an anachronism to  contemplate administrative  and 
institutional  reforms  that are not,  to  some  extent,  in line 
with  similar efforts that may  be  made  by  other partner states 
in the  same  community.  Even  beyond  the frontier regions,  or 
even in those  divided  by  a  frontier,  where  co-ordination is 
indispensable,  the creation of  a  European Council for Regional 
Planning appears,  among  the  tasks  to  be  undertaken,  altogether 
desirable. 
The  road  that no  doubt  leads  to  the constitution of  a 
European federation will  thus  be  the  natural  sequel  to  a  long-
established historical process. 
(Le  Monde,  27  August  1964) 
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3.  Public  finance  and  restraint in Europe 
Under  this heading and  referring to  Belgium's  budget 
for  1965,  "Le  Soir"  points  out  that  two  factors are  too  often 
left out  of  account.  The  first is  that  the  increase in 
domestic  prices is to  a  large  extent  the  result of  a  con-
tagious trend taking its normal  course  in the  European  Common 
Market.  The  Belg~an economy,  which  is heavily  dependent  on 
the  market  of  the  Six,  could not hope  to  evade  the  increase 
in prices  that has  been so  pronounced  among  her partners.  Even 
the  Dutch have  been unable  to  avoid  the  "European"  increase 
in wages.  Whatever  our financial  and monetary  policies may  be, 
events  occurring in neighbouring countries will in future 
exert  an increaslingly strong influence  on  our whole  economic 
life. 
The  second factor to  bear in mind  is that it is better 
for a  member  of  the  Common  W~rket to  borrow  from  other Member 
States  than from  non-Member States.  In other words,  should 
the  need  to  raise  a  loan ar.ise,  it would  be  better,  under 
present circumstances,  to  raise it in Frankfort or Amsterdam 
rather than in London  or New  York.  Why?  Because  our interests 
are  bound  up  with  those  of  the  other member  countries  of  the 
Common  Market  and  the  purchasing power  that we  borrow from 
them in the  form  of  a  demand for goods,  will  no  longer stimu-
late  economic  expansion.  In short,  loans  raised within the 
Common  Market  are  no  longer so  much  operations  undertaken 
"abroad"  but are  more  like loans  raised internally in terms 
of  their effect  on  the  economy. 
In discussing  recommendations  made  by  the authorities 
of  the  Common  Market,  it must  firmly  be  borne  in mind  that 
this  Common  Market  is a  fact.  It is in the  whole  range  of 
our relations with  the  other countries  of  the  Common  ~~rket 
that the  desirability and  economic  effect offoreign loans 
must  be  assessed. 
The  authority of  the  Common  Market  cannot  on  the  one 
hand  be  invoked if on  the  other hand  its existence  is by 
implication ignored. 
(Le  Soir,  2  August  1964) 
4.  The  French Press  and  the  freedom  of  establishment 
"Le  Monde"  has  published an analysis  of  the application 
to  the  French  press  of  the  directive  laying down  the arrange-
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ments  for the  freedom  of  establishment and  the  freedom  to 
supply services  in activities connected with  the  press. 
The  author points  out  that  the  proposal for a  directive 
incorporates  special provisions  that are more  or less explicit. 
Some  provisions,  such as  those  dealing with  the  scientific  or 
professional  qualifications  required for carrying out activi-
ties connected with  the  press,  do  not  seem to  apply  to  France 
and  in fact  make  no  reference  to  French law.  Other provisions 
give  rise  to  disturbing uncertainties.  This  is true  of Arti-
cle  6  in the  proposal  dealing with  the  right  of  Community 
nationals  to  join a  professional  organization and have  the 
same  rights  and  obligations as  the  nationals,  where  their 
membership  is  "one  of  the  conditions for their being admitted 
to  or for,exercising an activity connected with  the  press". 
"Our press  organization is,  to  a  large  extent,  a  co-operative 
organization.  Representatives  of  professional  associations are 
partly or wholly  responsible for managing  the  main services  of 
common  interest and assist,  on various  bodies,  in exercising 
control or taking action in a  way  undeniably concerned with 
the  conditions  or arrangements  governing the  exercise  of  activ.~ 
ties that are  connected with  the  press.  In future,  all  Communi-
ty nationals would,  without  reservation,  have  the  right  to  be 
appointed for such  duties  (in fact  such appointments  would 
appear unlikely but  we  have  the  time  to  deplore  the fact)  and 
Article  6,  if followed  to  its logical conclusion,  would  in-
volve  a  revision of Article  7  of  the  law  of  10  January  1957 
that established the  statute  of  the  France-Presse  agency.  It 
may  even  be  asked whether Article  7  of  the  directive,  which 
prohibits  the  granting,  to  nationals  of  one  of  the  Member 
States  going  to  another  Community  country,  of  aids likely to 
alter the  normal  conditions  of  establishment,  is not  such as 
to affect the application of  the  law  of  31  December  1956  that 
set up  a  "cultural fund",  particularly as  the  proposal  is 
specifically directed at the activities of  press  distribution 
agencies. 
Above  all,  and  this  should  be  stressed,  the  directive, 
in addition to  the  special abrogation provisions  that it 
includes  as  a  guide,  enunciates  the  principle  of  a  general 
elimination of  the  restrictions covered  by  Title III in the 
genermprogrammes- restrictions that are  as  varied as  they 
are  extensive,  ranging from  every restriction or obstacle  to 
the  exercise  of  an activity,  to  the  exclusion from  the  benefit 
of  any  direct or indirect aid granted  by  the  State.  It is  true 
that  the  elimination of  discriminatory  treatment  does  not  im-
ply  the abolition of  rights  or benefits accruing to  nationals. 
Furthermore,  over  the  more  or less long-term,  there  should 
not  ensue  any  increase  in costs within individual  states or any 
aggravation of  differences  of  conditions,  as  between states, 
that would  give  grounds  if not  justification for revising these 
rights  or benefiT.s.  In a  field where,  as  we  originally pointed 
out,  economics  and politics overlap,  the  political aspects 
reflect in the  most  sensitive manner,  the feelings  and  the 
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needs  of  the nation as  a  whole.  The  special  economic  arrange-
ments  affecting the  press  in France  (whether this  involves 
publishing houses  or connected  services)  are  intended,  in so 
far as  this is possible under the  present changing state  or 
techniques  and machinery generally,  to  guarantee  freedom  of 
information and  the full  exercize  of  the  social  responsibility 
that  infer-mation alone  can assume  and within the  framework  of 
which  the variety of  sources  and competitive activities can now 
play their part.  That  they manage  to·  do  so  only  imperfectly is 
no  doubt  due  to  some  extent at least to  their inadequacy.  Im-
provements here  may  be  desired and  planned  out.  The  basis can-
not  be  undermined.  nor  the  effec'ts curtailed without  direct pre-
judice  to  the  main  tool  of  a  political activity whose  means  or 
powers  would  thus  be  curiously dispersed and  without  any  obvi~ 
ous  justification.  The  explicit reference  in the  directive  to 
the  provisions  in the  decree  of  26  August  1964,  that apply 
only  to political or general  information newspapers,  is highly 
significant.  Indeed,  no-one  can in good faith  regard  the  Common 
Market  merely as  a  "commercial  bloc"  ignoring any  influence  or 
political purpose it may  have.  It is also necessary  to  know 
where  one  is going,  how  and at what ·price. 
All  roads  lead to  Rome  and  we  do  not wish  to  overburden 
our reservations with  disputes  about  method.  One  carmot, 
however,  help  thinking that it would  have  been better,  in 
order to assess  the  desirability and  the  extent  of  the appli-
cation of  the  Treaty of  Rome  to  the  press, ,to  take  a  stand-
point within the  system that the  press  represents as  a  whole 
without  darting about here  and  there within the  system,  pick-
ing out at  random  this  or that special provision that appeared 
to fall within the  scope  of  the  Treaty,  even where  these  pro-
visions  were  subsequently more  or less  dependent  on general 
rules  that did not  seem  to have  been designed for that purpose. 
Thus,  before  any final  decision is taken,  a  lucid analysis 
of  the  scope  and  implications  of  the  draft directive  is indi-
cated.  This  analysis,  if one  is  to  judge  by  the uncertainties 
that  the  text  of  the  directives leaves unresolved,  calls per-
haps  for still further explanation and confrontations  (even 
by  recourse  to  an extension of  the  timelag that  the  Treaty 
permits).  The  analysis  should in any case,  and  whatever the 
political options,  lead to  the  necessary explanations  and 
guarantees  being given so  that  (if one  is unwilling to  go  so 
far as  to  develop it to  the  Common  Market  scale)  the  where-
withal may  be  guaranteed for  implementing that freedom  of  the 
press  to which  we  are keenly attached." 
(Le  Monde,  29  August  1964) 
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IV.  SOCIAL  QUESTIONS 
Chronological  Summary 
Demonstration in Dortmund  by  the mining'trade 
unions  of  the  ECSC  countries for a  social 
Europe 
1.  Proposal for the  establishment  of  an Action Committee 
for a  European Miner's  Code 
The  refusal  of  the majority  of  representatives  of  em-
ployers  and  of certain governments  to  open discussions  on  the 
establishment  of  a  European Miner's  Code  gave  rise  to  a  series 
of  reactions  in June  and  July  1964 in trade union circles. 
The  Christian miners'  and  energy sector workers'  unions 
organized a  meeting in Saarbrlicken  on  5  June  1964 at which 
Mr.  Engel,  Secretary of  the  Federation of Christian Unions  in 
the  ECSC,  proposed  that an action committee  be  set up  to 
obtain the  introduction of  a  European Miner's  Code;  the  com-
mittee  would  comprise  not  only union representatives  from  the 
various  opinion groups  but also  members  of  the  European 
Parliament.  The  latter had voted unanimously  in June  1961 
in favour  of  the  establishment  of  such  a  Code,  The  arguments 
put forward  by  Mr.  Engel  in favour  of  the  establishment  of  a 
European Miner's  Code  were  quoted  in the  communique  issued  on  . 
25  June  1964 following an extraordinary meeting of  the  Standing 
Committee  of  the  International Federation of  Christian Miners' 
Unions  (IFCMU): 
Through  the  absence  of  any  ~ocial policy designed  to 
stimulate  the  recruitment  of miners it was  becoming  increasing-
ly difficult to find men  either at the  national  or the  inter-
national level.  The  pace  of manpower  turnover was  increasing; 
it was  expensive  and  out  of  proportion;  the  average  age  of the 
labour force  was  becoming  disturbingly high. 
A stable and  increasingly skilled labour,force  was  vital 
to  the future  of  the  coal  industry. 
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The  Standing Committee  of  the  IFCMU  therefore considered 
a  policy whereby  wages  and living standards  in the  mines  did 
not  keep  pace  with  the  other sectors  and  whereby  labour was 
recruited in countries with  a  low  standard of living was  both 
politically and  socially ill-advised. 
A  fundamentally  revised labour policy was  urgently needed 
if European coal  production was  to  be  competitive;  every effort 
should  be  made  to  accomplish  this without waiting until com-
plete agreement  had  been  reached  on  a  European  energy policy. 
The  miner's  occupation,  both materially and  psychologically, 
should  be  radically improved  as  a  result of  this policy,  re-
ference  being made  to  the  draft European Miner's  Code  worked 
out  by  the  International  Federation of Miners'  Unions  and 
Free  Miners'  Unions. 
The  wherewithal  and  legal  opportunities  to  enforce  this 
code.were  lacking so  that it was  at the  national level  that' 
action was  called for under present conditions  to  achieve  the 
aims  stated.  • 
(Original  documents) 
2.  Dortmund  rally calls for  a  soc ia·lly integra  ted  Europe 
More  than  20,000  trade unionist miners  from  ECSC  countries 
met  in Dortmund  on  4  July at  a  rally in which  they  "expressed 
their determination to  strive for real social  integration in 
Europe".  To  this  end,  they  espoused  the  principles  and  aims 
of  European policy  embodied  in the  following  resolutions: 
One  of  the  three  resolutions  concerns  the  European Miner's 
Code  which it describes  as  an effective means  of  improving 
working conditions  in the  ~ines and  of putting an  end  to  the 
insecurity and  dissatisfaction at present prevailing in the 
industry.  The  trade unions  express  their conviction that  the 
European Miner's  Code  would facilitate harmonization of  work-
ing conditions,  considerably  reduce  fluctuations  in available 
manpower  and  increase safety at work  and  productivity.  They 
therefore call upon governments  and  employers  alike  to help 
to  remove  the  acute  manpower  shortage  in the  coalmining in-
dustry  through  the  adoption of  the  European Miner's  Code.  While 
welcoming  the  constant  endeavours  of  the  High  Authority and  of 
the  European  Parlia~ent to  bring the  governments,  workers  and 
trade unions  together to  discuss  the  Miner's  Code,  the  reso-
lution sharply criticizes  the  "negative attitude and  lack of 
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foresight"  of  the  employers  and certain governments  against 
whose  resistance all the  efforts made  so far had  foundered. 
In another resolution- on social policy -it is pointed 
out  that miners  simply cannot understand  why  resistance  -
whether  open  or  concealed'  - should  today  be  offered  to  social 
integration by  governments  and  employers.  This  not  only  ran 
counter to  an essential provision of  the  Treaty  - raising 
of  the  standard-of living- but also  undermined  the  workers' 
confidence  in the  European  idea.  The  trade  unions  stress their 
conviction that  "economic  integration in whatever form is in-
conceivable  in the  absence  of  social integration".  In their 
view,  miners  must  therefore  be  allotted an extensive  and high 
position in the  social  scale.  To  this  end,  the  High Authority 
must  continue  to carry out its tasks  and  exercise  its powers 
in the field of  social policy  on  the  basis  of  a  wide  inter-
pretation of  the  Treaty,  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  must 
put  into  effect the  social policy  recommendations  of  the  High 
Authority and  the  European Parliament.  The  trade  unions  re-
quest  that: 
the  building of  dwellings for miners  should  be  speeded up; 
-priority should  be  given to  industrial health and  safety; 
- occupational  training and  trainee  programmes  should  be  co-
ordinated and  improved at Community level in order to  achieve 
real  freedom  of  movement; 
- no  effort should  be  spared  to  harmonize all social policy 
provisions. 
A  third resolution -on European  energy policy  - critfu~es 
the  protocol  agreement  approved  by  the  Council  of Ministers  in 
April  1964 as  laying down  only  a  number  of  principles  and  no 
practical political measures.  The  miners  therefore call  "once 
and for all for binding declarations  on  energy policy aims 
and  on  the  measures  to  be  expected,  as  it is  thus  that their 
occupational  and  social prospects will  be  determined".  The 
coalmining industry  - they  declare  - must  be  accorded  a  perma-
nent  place  in the  co-ordinated  energy policy,  production being 
maintained at present levels  irrespective  of  market fluctu-
ations.  The  miners  are  in favour  of  a  uniform system of coal 
subsidies  as  they feel  that it would  be  "disastrous if free 
competition were  to  be  the  sole factor  operating in the  energy 
market".  It will  be  necessary,  however,  to  avoid  distorting 
competition,  to  ensure  that  the  collection and  distribution of 
funds  is controlled by  a  Community  institution,  that public 
funds  are  not misused  by coalmining undertakings  and  that any 
aid granted is administered in such  a  way  that miners  can 
benefit from  social progress  like any  other workers. 
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During a  previous  discussion,  Mr.  Del  Bo,  President of 
the  High Authority,  stated that "all the  arguments  in favour 
of  a  miner's  code still apply,  quite apart from  the fact that 
we  are  now  faced  with a  new  situation that could facilitate a 
positive  resumption of  the  talks".  The  "Protocol  of an Agree-
ment  concerning the  common  energy policy"  of  21  April  1964 
had provided  the  groundwork for introducing a  system  of  sub-
sidies for the  coalmining industry at Community  level.  Em-
ployers were  therefore  in a  position to  decide  on their ration-
alization and.production targets  and also  to put  them  into 
effect.  "There  therefore  exists.a wide  measure  of  economic 
certainty",  explained Mr.  Del  Bo,  "which all the  more  justi-
fies  the  demand  for a  miner's  code  and  disposes  of any  grounds 
for delaying its adoption".  As  the  High Authority could not  go 
beyond  the  limits of  the  agreement,  the  question of  wages  and 
of  social security should,  for the  moment  at least,  be  set 
aside  and  efforts concentrated  on  those  objectives that held 
out  the  best prospects  of  success.  It was  essential therefore 
to  adopt certain measures  th~t would  guarantee  a  re~l pro-
fessional career to  the miner.  Such measures  would,  of  course, 
cost money.  A solution to  the  problem of financing  them would, 
however,  have  to  be  found,  this being the  price that  "must 
be  paid if we  are  simultaneously  to  ensure  employment for 
the miner and  the  production of coal". 
(Original  rally documents,  summary  by  the  High Authority, 
4  July  1964) 
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P  a  r  t  II· 
THE  PARLIAMENTS 
Chronological  summary 
Bundesrat  opinions  on draft EEC  regulations 
concerning: 
- quality wines  from  certain vine-growing 
areas, 
- the gradual establishment of a  common 
market  organization for  sugar, 
exception regulations  covering rice and 
scrap rice imports  from  the Associated 
African States and  Madagascar, 
- the application of the rules of  competi-
tion in respect of rail, 'road and  inland 
water transport; 
Opinion  on  a  draft preliminary directive 
covering the  awarding  and execution of 
building projects; 
Resolution  on  a  draft regulation concerning 
production compensation for  cereal and 
potato starch. 
Debate  on European policy in the  Chamber  of 
Deputies. 
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1.  Germany 
Opinion  of the Bundestag  on draft regulations of the  EEC 
Commission 
At its session of 10 July the  Bundesrat expressed its 
opinion  on  a  number  of documents  submitted by  the  EEC~  among  them 
the draft regulation on guality wines  of specified  origin~regard­
ing which it voiced "considerable misgivings".  It therefore 
requested the  Federal  Government~  too~ not to approve  the draft 
in its present form. 
In support of its  views~  the Bundesrat pointed out that the 
draft had  taken over in its entirety the wine classification 
system of the  French wine  marketing  organization which  distin-
guished between wine  of specified origin and  consumer wine.  Such 
a  system could not be  adopted  for wine-growing in Germany  where 
conditions  of production were  entirely different and-the wines 
produced differed widely  from  the  French and Italian products.In 
the  Northern  zone~ where  the  quality of wines  fluctuated widely 
with the  locality~  type  of wine  and  season~  to make  a  distinction 
between quality and non-quality vineyards was  as unreasonable  and 
impracticable as  to attempt to establish maximum  yield values. 
Moreover~  the  general ban  on  sweetening  amounted  to discrimina-
tion against low-alcohol  German  wines  which  ill the  maj_n  could not 
dispense with this.  Finally,  the draft regulation made  the  Ad-
ministrative  Committee  on  Wine~ whose  decisions were arrived at 
by majority  vote~  solely responsible  for  a  number  of provisions 
that were  of outstanding  importance  for  both wine-growing  and 
consumer protection,  while  the  Commission  reserved to itself 
undefined executive  powers.  Such  a  procedure was  unacceptable. 
The  Bundesrat also expressed misglvlngs  regarding  the  mar-
keting control system  on which  the draft regulation  on  the  stage-
by-stage establishment  of a  common  sugar marketing  organization 
was  based,  because it did not  make  sufficient allowance  for  the 
special conditions  of the  sugar  market  and  sugar-beet culti-
vation. 
The  Bundesrat felt that if the  control measures  so  far 
operated with success  by  the  partner countries  (fixing of mar-· 
keting and production  rights~ limitation of price guarantee)  were 
abandoned~ the widely  feared  surplus production  could be  counter-
acted only through the  price  mechanism  - where  necessary,  there-
fore,  only by reducing prices in varying degrees.  Consequently  -
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contrary to Article 39  of the  EEC  Treaty - insufficient account 
might be  taken  of the natural disparities in cost and yield on 
the  sugar market  of major  vine-growing areas,  which  could  thus 
suffer  considerably.  In the  foreseeable  future,  there would 
arise the  danger  of excessive  one-sided demands  on  the  Common 
Agricultural Guidance  and Guarantee  Fund.  The  Federal  Government 
was  therefore requested to use its influence to maintain the 
level of German  sugar-beet cultivation and  sugar production and 
ensure that the price mechanism of the  sugar marketing organiza-
tion was  supplemented by  a  system of quantity control. 
The  Bundesrat then went  on  to specify a  number  of regula-
tions which it felt the  Federal Government  should either amend 
or  supplement. 
In a  resolution on  the  draft regulation relating to refunds 
in the-production of wheat  and potato-starch,  the Bundesrat 
requested the  Federal Government  to ensure,  at the  forthcoming 
negotiations with the EEC  Commission,  that: 
maize  prices  for  starch producers would  be  harmonized in the 
Community; 
uniform scales  of valuation would  be  introduced for potatoes 
as  raw material and  for  starch processing products; 
starch potato producers would  be  guaranteed a  price  commen-
surate with their  cos~s through the  granting of  further aid. 
The  Federal Government  was  further requested to use its 
influence with a  view  once  and  for all of abolishing any  measure 
that tended to distort competition in the  EEC  Member  States. 
(Federal Council publications 202/64,  158/64  and  278/64  session 
of 10 July 1964) 
2.  Italy 
Debate  on  European policy in the Italian Chamber  of  Depu~s 
~  In the  course  of the  debate  on  a  motion  of  confidence  in the 
\  Government,  Mr.  Aldo  Moro,  President of the  Council,  stated that 
Italy was  making its contribution as  a  loyal partner at every 
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community  level~ both economic  and political. Italy was  endeav-
ouring to strengthen the European institutions through the  pro-
posed  merger  of the Executives  and  the direct election of  the 
~uropean Parliament.  The  aim  of the Italian Government  was  the 
creation of a  democratic  and  "open"  Europe  that did not  exclude 
any  country without  justification; this Europe  would  move  towards 
authentic integration and  be  bound  by  strong links  of solidarity 
with the United States  of America.  The  course  followed,  of vital 
importance both of Italy itself and  the world at large,  had~ 
despite earlier hopes,  been fraught with difficulties that had 
made  progress  slower than expected.  It had~ however,  to  be  fol-
lowed  calmly and without despondency;  in this way  the  prospect  of 
an important historical development  could  be  opened up  to  future 
generations.  Such  a  great design called for  a  wide  measure  of 
agreement  and  strong popular  support.  Italy would  work~excluding 
and remaining unbiased by  any special  interests~  for  the  gradual 
harmonization of the  constituent ideals and policies of a  united 
Europe.  This  would not be unlike  the Europe  conceived by  the 
great men  who  initiated its construction - a  force  for unity and 
peace~  capable  of pursuing  a  common  policy against  the wider 
background  of the  democratic nations  of  the West  and  fitting into 
the intricate pattern of wider  international relations. 
Mr.  Scelba  (Christian Democrat)  taking the  floor in  turn~ 
observed that before  enlarging the  Community  of the  Six it was 
pertinent to reflect  on  its consolidation.  The  Europe  of the Six 
was  not Europe.  However,  the  speaker pointed  out~  to replace 
France  by  Great Britain in the  Community  would not enlarge it but 
simply break up  the Treaties  of Rome.  Every  opposing  theory erred 
by  being  too abstract and  the  principle of holding  out for  the 
maximum  of  one
1s  demands  and  rejecting compromises  was  also 
fraught with danger  and  sterile in regard to the political uni-
fication of Europe.  Efforts to unify the Executives  of the  Com-
munity  and  to obtain the  election by  universal suffrage of the 
European Parliament should be  intensified and all the  six coun-
tries were  agreed that these were  necessary.  Mr.  Scelba  then. 
pointed out that the Treaties of Rome  made  no  provision for  po-
litical unification;  any step towards political unity could  only 
result from  the  concerted resolve  of the  six  countries~ whose 
final objective should be  the  creation of the United States of 
Europe.  The  necessary conditions  for  such an objective did not 
obtain at  present as France's  opposition stood in the way  of its 
pursuit~ despite certain statements by  General  de  Gaulle  that 
were  full of hope  and trust but in conflict with his present 
policy.  This  did not mean  that one  should wait and  do  nothing as 
was  the  case with the Italy of the centre-Left. 
In Mr.  Scelba
1s  opinion~  the Fouchet  Plan~  submitted by  the 
French  President~ had  the  merit of being practical and was  in&red 
worthy of discussion.  Unfortunately~  however~ it was  not pursued 
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for  fear  that the proposals it contained might be  surreptitiously 
designed to create a  French political hegemony:  had  a  different 
course  been followed,  the  much  deplored Franco-German Treaty 
might not have  come  about.  In conclusion,  Mr.  Scelba  described as 
specious  the  present "wait and  see"  policy that consisted in an 
unwillingness  to prejudice the  conditions for  the  United King-
dom's  entry into the Community  when it was  notorious that the 
attitude of that country  towards  European political integration 
was  exactly the  same  as  that of France. 
Mr.  Gaetano  Martino  (Liberal)  deplored as  much  as Mr.  Scelba 
the negative  line  taken by  the Italian Government  in regard to 
European  problems  but he  differed from Mr.  Scelba in emphasizing 
that the Treaties of Rome  did contain principles that anticipated 
the  construction of Europe at the political level - failing which 
the  economic  structure wml.ld  itself be  threatened.  Mr.  Martino 
further wished to make  it clear that the Italian liberals in no 
way  shared  the  ideas  of General  de  Gaulle as  to how  Europe  should 
be built up,  especially the proposals  for  a  confederation system 
- warning  example  of whose  ineffectiveness was  the  Franco-German 
Treaty.  The  Fouchet  Plan itself had not represented a  step for-
ward.  The  Liberals had  always  been and  remained  in favour  of  the 
United States of Europe  and  of amplifying the  European  construc-
tion,  notably  to  embrace  the  United Kingdom;it had  on several 
occasions  called for  th~s and  had  therefore  strongly deplored 
the hostile gesture  of  General  de  Gaulle.  They  did not,  however, 
in the name  of the great Europe  of  tomorrow,  intend to renounce 
the little Europe  of today with all its latent federal  impli-
cations.  But was  this the  view  of the Italian Government  ?  To 
judge  by what  Mr.  Saragat,  Minister for  Foreign Affairs,  wrote 
and  did,  the  Government  appeared,  with a  Labour victory in the 
United Kingdom  in prospect,  to be  searching for  new  formulae  on 
the basis of the  principle  "everything with the United Kingdom, 
nothing without it". W:q.at  are these new  formulae?  Mr.  Martino 
went  on  to  say that the  programme  of the first Moro  Administra-
tion contained interesting new  features,  first among  which was 
the  campaign for  elections to the  European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage which would represent an  immeasurable  progress 
towards  the political Europe  which  could never  be  constructed 
without  the direct intervention of the will of the  people.  This 
undertaking,  however,  had  found  no practical expression under 
that Government:  it was  true that an initiative had been  taken 
by Minister Saragat but it had  done  more  harm  than good.  Instead 
of negotiations all that had been achieved was  a  compromise, 
sanctioned by Article 138  of the  EEC  Treaty,  whose  terms  had  in 
fact been respected by  the European Parliament when it submitted 
in 1960  a  plan for  the election by universal suffrage  of  the 
Parliament which the European Council of Ministers  took care not 
to study.  In this connexion,  the  proposals  submitted by  the 
Italian Government  made  no  reference  to Article 138  or to the 
plan formulated by  the European  Parliament;  this had helped to 
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get the  question shelved.  This negative  move  was  perhaps under-
standable if a  speech by Minister Saragat for  a  Socialist Europe 
were  remembered.  Yet  such a  formula  was  not in keeping with the 
spirit of  freedom  that inspired the  Community.  The  nascent 
institutions needed  courage  and  faith:  and  the  Europe  of the  Six 
at its emergence  had  the help  of the  courage  and  faith of men 
like Alcide  De  Gasperi.  The  hope  that  one  could  formulate  today 
was  that the  admirable  example  given by  that great statesman in 
very difficult moments  - the  speaker  concluded  - would  illuminate, 
for  the  good  of his  country,  the  thoughts  and  actions  of his 
successors. 
Concluding the  debate,  Mr.  Moro  replied to Mr.  Scelba by 
stating that there was  no  doubt  a  lot  of truth in what  he  said 
but that he  had neglected to  suggest any practical solution. It 
was  undeniably true that it was  desirable to  consolidate  the 
Community  of the  Six before  enlarging it, but that was  in fact 
what  was  being done  with a  due  measure  of responsibility and  in 
the  face  of  immeasurable  difficulty.  No-one  furthermore  thought 
that the United Kingdom  could  be  substituted for  France  in the 
Community;  the  Community  emerged as an entity open to the widest 
degree  of association and its institutions and  own  natural bias 
tended in this direction.  Referring to the reservations  expressed 
by  Mr.  Martino  on  the  European  commitments  of the  Government,  the 
President of the  Council  observed that Italy was  making its 
contribution and  collaborating in good  faith at every Community 
level and  that it had undertaken to seek the widest  measure  of 
consent  from  the people,  as well as its direct help in building 
an  economic  and political European  Community;  this was  consistent 
with the action taken by every Italian Government  since  1950. 
Mr.  Moro  then stated that the Italian proposal  of  24  February 
for  the election of  members  of the European  Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage  originated in the proposal  put  forward  to this 
effect by  the European Parliament.  Far  from  doing  any  harm  this 
had  served a  most useful purpose  in that the  EEC  Council had in 
July undertaken to resume  the  study  of  the Italian proposal after 
the unification of  the Executives. 
(Chamber  of Deputies - Summary  of proceedings  of 30 July and 4 
and 6 August) 
3.  Netherlands 
a)  Parliamentary control and  the  merger  of the Executives 
Is the  Government  prepared  to  consider parliamentary  centro~ 
particularly over  the  budgets  of the  Communities,  as  a  prerequi-
site for  any  discussion on  the  merger  of the European Executives? 
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In reply to this question by  Mr.  Van  der Goes  van Naters 
(Socialist)  in the  Second Chamber  of the  States General,  Mr.Luns 
stated on 10  June  1964  that careful consideration should be  gi~ 
to  the question of  choosing  the right moment  before  pronouncing 
the  "non possumus".  The  Netherlands  are anxious  that the  merger 
should be  achieved as it would  strengthen considerably  the posi-
tion of the  single executive as well as that of the European 
Parliament. 
With regard to the  present powers  of  the  European  Parliament, 
Mr.  Luns  stated that the right of veto of  the European Parliament 
over  the  budget  of the  ECSC  is now  under  discussion.  This  con-
cerns  a  different kind  of budgetary  control that will eventually 
disappear. 
The  question of parliamentary control,  however,  can no 
longer be  avoided if the  Parliament is really going  to have 
powers  of its own.  This  could already be  the  case  on  1  January  or 
1  July 1965,  and will be  so at any rate by  1  January 1970.  At 
the  moment,  the  question under  discussion is whether  the  influx 
of money  to  the  Community,  as  a  result of agricultural regula-
tions,  can be  regarded as  money  of which  the  EEC  Commission  can 
actually dispose.  Disposal  of this money  is linked up  to measures 
for  carrying out directives laid down  in regulations.  For  future 
Council decisions  concerning  the resources  o~ the Agricultural 
Fund,  national approval is required in accordance  with Article 2 
of Regulation No.  25. 
Mr.  Luns  promised  to  submit  a  report to the  Second  Chamber 
on the question of parliamentary control and  on the  most  appro-
priate form  for  such control. 
(Proceedings  of the  Second  Chamber,  1963-64  Session,  10  June 
1964) 
b)  The  Dutch  Government  puts  a  brake  on  coal  imports  from 
third countries 
In reply to a  question by  Messrs.  Nederhorst  and  Oele  (both 
Socialists),  Mr.  Andriessen  (Minister for Economic  Affairs) 
confirmed that the  Dutch Government  had urged  the  Dutch  power 
stations to obtain their coal  supplies  from  the  Federal Republic 
of Germany.  This  step is in accordance with a  Government  commit-
ment  entered into in 1958  when it declared itself prepared,  in 
compliance with an  ECSC  request,  to ensure  that  the ratio of 
coal  imports  from  third countries  to coal  imports  from  the  Com-
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munity  does not develop  less  favourably  towards  the latter. The 
Dutch  Government has accordingly prevented,  by its action  on 
behalf of the  German  suppliers  (Belgium is not prepared to 
supply)  imports  from  the  ECSC  area  from  being practically halved. 
(Proceedings  of the  Second Chamber,  1963-64  Session,  20  June 
1964) 
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